Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era:
Exploitative or Competitive?
Jennifer Robackt
This paper explores the economic effects of certain Southern
labor laws from the Jim Crow era.1 The motivation for these labor
laws was to prevent movement of black laborers and increases in
their wages. Throughout the period, we read of white planters
pleading with one another to hold down black wages. "White men
have to stick together" was the common theme. Despite all these
admonitions, white employers vigorously competed with one another for black labor, and there are numerous reports of blacks
leaving jobs to take higher-paying opportunities.2
Some economic historians have concluded that laws aimed at
t Assistant Professor of Economics, Yale University. I am grateful to Charles McCurdy
for bringing this problem to my attention. Discussions with John Bigelow and Joseph Tracy
have been helpful. Useful comments from Howard Dickman, Robert Fogel, and other participants in the labor law conference have been incorporated into this paper. I am grateful
to all of these people. The Earhart Foundation provided financial support for this paper,
which is part of a larger project on government and racism.
The bulk of the labor laws discussed in this paper were passed in the 1890's and early
1900's, the era during which most of the Jim Crow legal system was put into place. See infra
Chart I. Similar labor laws, however, also existed as part of the Black Codes in most states
for a brief period immediately after the Civil War. The Black Codes were an attempt to
maintain control over the black population similar to the control that had existed in the
slavery era. Reconstruction legislation invalidated the Black Codes. See, e.g., Civil Rights
Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982)). Further application of these labor laws had to await the Jim Crow period.
It should be noted that the Jim Crow period did not begin with the end of Reconstruction. There was a period of some twenty years of relatively harmonious and tolerant racial
relations between Reconstruction and Jim Crow. The Jim Crow laws are commonly associated with extreme, legally mandated segregation of the races. But disenfranchisement of the
black population preceded this radical segregation; indeed, disenfranchisement was necessary to accomplish segregation. Political motivations thus provided the original impetus for
disenfranchisement; economic exploitation, through law and custom, came later. See infra
Chart I, which includes as reference points the dates of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), and the first disenfranchisement amendments. It is best to regard Jim Crowism as a
legal and political system that had economic consequences. The labor laws discussed in this
paper are examples of economic legislation passed under the umbrella of disenfranchisement. For a good general history of the Jim Crow era, see C. VANN WOODWARD, THE

(3d rev. ed. 1974).
2 For illustrative examples, see STEPHEN DECANIO,
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repressing blacks were largely ineffective because we observe so
much evidence of economic competition. Robert Higgs is a proponent of this view.3 Stephen DeCanio draws the same conclusion
from an extensive econometric study that showed that farm labor
was not paid less than the value of its marginal product.4 Others,
including William Cohen, Roger Ransom, and Richard Sutch, have
argued that the laws were indeed effective at repressing blacks.5
They base this conclusion on massive amounts of anecdotal evidence that whites were taking advantage of blacks.
My approach combines elements from both these lines of inquiry. The economists are correct in describing the labor market of
this period as essentially competitive, and the historians are correct in concluding that blacks were exploited. My contention is
that the laws can best be understood as attempts to enforce a labor-market cartel among white employers that could not be enforced in any other way.
The planters wanted to collude to hold down black wages,
both to increase their own profits and to solidify the dominant position of the white race. But, as Higgs documents,' economic class
interest and white solidarity were not adequate to overcome the
economic incentive for individual planters to offer higher wages to
blacks. The laws were intended to accomplish what race prejudice
could not do by itself.
An analogy to import quotas illustrates the necessity of involving the government in cartel enforcement. It is obvious why import
quotas are advantageous to domestic automobile manufacturers. It
is also obvious that many people will find it advantageous to evade
the restrictions by smuggling foreign cars to meet the excess domestic demand for them. But suppose that the car manufacturers
had to bear the costs of enforcing the quotas themselves. They
would have to secure the American borders, patrol the coastal waters, and inspect goods brought into the country. In short, they
would have to duplicate many of the services provided by the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard, and the Customs Service. Quotas
would no longer be profitable to domestic manufacturers. Simi3 ROBERT HIGGS, COMPETmION AND COERCION: BLACKS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 18651914 (1977).
4 S. DECANIO, supra note 2, at 12.
5 The clearest example is Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 18651940: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31 (1976). Ransom & Sutch, The Ex-Slave in

the Post-Bellum South: A Study of the Economic Impact of Racism in a Market Environment, 33 J. ECON. HIsT. 131 (1973), promotes a similar view in a slightly different context.
6 R. HIGGs, supra note 3, at 37-61.
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larly, Southern planters may have found it quite profitable to collude to hold down black wages, but only as long as they could pass
the enforcement costs on to state and local governments.
This paper explains how this transfer took place and suggests
that both the economic historians and the conventional historians
are correct in the major parts of their theses. Competition was the
primary force in the agricultural labor market in this period. Race
prejudice was also an important factor, and whites could successfully take advantage of blacks over a substantial period of time.
Exploitation was not inherent in the capitalist system; rather, government power had to be specifically mobilized to achieve this end.
The importance of this interpretation cannot be overstated.
Gary Becker's argument that discrimination is unprofitable to the
discriminators and should eventually disappear from a competitive
market setting7 is widely accepted. Yet differences in earnings between blacks and whites persist. This fact does not by itself refute
the Becker hypothesis, since Becker's analysis explicitly excluded
government intervention." In fact, governments in the United
States-federal, state, and local-have probably never been racially neutral. Thus, it is essential that we understand and explore
the interaction between a competitive market and a government
that may favor certain racial groups in the economic arena. To
demonstrate these points, I will show (1) what economic effects we
should observe if the Jim Crow laws were perfectly enforced and
(2) that some of these effects are in fact observable. Before turning
to these two tasks, I will describe the laws themselves and some
characteristics of the agricultural society in which they were
passed.

I. THE JIM CROW LAWS
The Southern legal system aided the enforcement of a labormarket cartel through four basic types of legislation. These were
(1) enticement laws9 and contract-enforcement laws, 10 which were
(2d ed. 1971).
Id. at 19-20. In his introduction to the second edition, however, Becker does note the
effect government has had in perpetuating discrimination: "The most important and pervasive influence [on restrictions on minority employment] clearly has been government action." Id. at 7. He expressly mentions "the restrictions legislated against Negroes in various
southern states." Id.
I Act of Feb. 6, 1866, No. 100, 1865-66 Ala. Acts 111; Act of Mar. 6, 1875, § 8, 1874-75
Ark. Acts 230-31; Act of Jan. 12, 1865, No. 7, § 5, 1865-66 Fla. Laws 32-33; Act of Dec. 17,
1901, No. 390, 1901 Ga. Laws 63; Act of July 10, 1890, No. 138, 1890 La. Acts 178; Act of
Feb. 21, 1890, ch. 56, 1890 Miss. Laws 69; Act of Feb. 24, 1905, § 3, 1905 N.C. Sess. Laws
333; Act of Dec. 24, 1880, No. 349, 1879-80 S.C. Acts 423; Act of Mar. 23, 1875, ch. 93, 1875
7 GARY BECKER, THE EcONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION

8
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designed to limit competition in the labor market to the beginning
of each contract year; (2) vagrancy laws,1 1 which were designed to
prevent blacks from being unemployed or otherwise out of the labor force; (3) emigrant-agent laws,1 2 which were designed to restrict the activities of labor recruiters; and (4) the convict-lease
system, which provided punishment for blacks who violated the
above or other laws.13 Chart I shows dates of passage for the first
three sets of laws and the approximate duration of the convictlease system.

Tenn. Pub. Acts 168.
While some of these enticement statutes have been repealed, see, e.g., Act of June 11,
1943, ch. 22068, § 6, 1943 Fla. Laws 834, a good number are still on the books, see, e.g.,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-23-29 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-358 (1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-130 (1976).
10 Act of Feb. 17, 1885, No. 85, 1884-85 Ala. Acts 142; Act of May 6, 1907, No. 271, 1907
Ark. Acts 620; Act of June 8, 1891, No. 23, 1891 Fla. Laws 57; MISS. CODE ANN. § 1148
(1906); Act of Mar. 11, 1889, ch. 444, 1889 N.C. Sess. Laws 423, as amended by Act of Feb.
12, 1891, ch. 106, 1891 N.C. Sess. Laws 98; Act of Feb. 24, 1908, No. 494, 1908 S.C. Acts 536.
Many of the contract-enforcement statutes have been repealed. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 26,
1928, ch. 292, 1928 Miss. Laws 366. Some, however, have not been repealed. See, e.g., N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-359 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40.404 (1952). For a discussion of the attacks
on the constitutionality of contract-enforcement legislation, see infra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
11Act of Sept. 22, 1903, No. 229, 1903 Ala. Acts 244; Act of May 6, 1905, No. 283, 1905
Ark. Acts 702; Act of May 29, 1905, No. 48, 1905 Fla. Laws 97; GA. CODE vol. III, § 453
(1895); Act of July 8, 1908, No. 205, 1908 La. Acts 308; Act of Feb. 29, 1904, ch. 144, 1904
Miss. Laws 199; Act of Mar. 4, 1905, ch. 391, 1905 N.C. Sess. Laws 41; Act of Dec. 22, 1893,
No. 348, 1893 S.C. Acts 521; Act of Mar. 24, 1875, § 1, 1875 Tenn. Pub. Acts 188; Act of
Mar. 17, 1909, ch. 59, 1909 Tex. Gen. Laws 111; Act of Jan. 2, 1904, ch. 548, § 884, 1902-04
Va. Acts 876.
Some of the vagrancy statutes have been formally repealed. See, e.g., Act of June 2,
1972, No. 1306, 1972 S.C. Acts 2490. In any event, it is now clear that these statutes are
unconstitutional and hence unenforceable. See Broughton v. Brewer, 298 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.
Ala. 1969) (vagrancy statute unconstitutionally vague); Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp.
58 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (same); Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (unconstitutionally broad).
2 Act of Jan. 22, 1879, No. 175, 1878-79 Ala. Acts 205, as amended by Act of Dec. 8,
1880, No. 127, 1880 Ala. Acts 162; Act of June 1, 1903, No. 87, 1903 Fla. Laws 135; Act of
Feb. 16, 1876, No. 14, 1876 Ga. Laws 17; Act of Mar. 11, 1912, ch. 94, 1912 Miss. Laws 73;
Act of Feb. 6, 1891, ch. 75, 1891 N.C. Sess. Laws 77; Act of Dec. 24, 1891, No. 697, 1891 S.C.
Acts 1084; Act of Apr. 7, 1917, ch. 70, 1917 Tenn. Pub. Acts 179, 189; Act of July 18, 1929,
ch. 96, 1929 Tex. Gen. Laws (2d Seass.) 203; Act of Mar. 21, 1924, ch. 452, 1924 Va. Acts 679.
Some of the emigrant-agent laws have been repealed. See, e.g., Employment and Labor
Agency Law, ch. 67, § 22, 1943 Tex. Gen. Laws 93. Some state emigrant-agent licensing
schemes have survived. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-2-6 (1982).
13 See H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, pt. 5, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1886); 5 Rep. Sec'y of the
Interior 8-13 (1887); H.R. Doc. No. 33, pt. 5, 54th Cong., 1st Seass. (1896); Bull. of the Dep't
of Labor 450-51 (1896); H.R. Doc. No. 906, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1905); TWENTETH ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COMMIssIoNER OF LABOR, 1905: CoNVwr LABOR 230-70 (1906); S. Doc. No.
494, 63d Cong., 2d Seass. (1914); FEDERAL AND STATE LAws RELATING TO CoNvicT LABOR 1220 (1914); BUREAU OF LABOR STATisTics, BuLL. No. 372, CoNWcT LABOR IN 1923, at 17 (1925).
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Enticement and Contract-Enforcement Laws

The enticement laws made it a crime for an employer to "entice" a laborer who had a contract with another employer. These
laws, directed primarily at white employers, sought to prevent employers from actively competing with each other for contract labor.
Enticement statutes in both criminal and civil law have a long history, going back as far as fourteenth-century England.14 Cohen
states that
[s]eventeenth-century Americans often viewed the enticement
of a servant as a crime against society (that is, a violation of
criminal law), but later generations took the matter less seriously and treated it as 'a civil wrong involving only private
rights. By the mid-nineteenth century criminal prosecutions
for enticing a servant had become virtually nonexistent, and
civil cases were rare. 15
Nevertheless, ten of the eleven Southern states that passed enticement legislation made it a criminal offense, rather than a civil
wrong. 16
The contract-enforcement laws, directed primarily at black
farm laborers, imposed criminal sanctions for the breach of an employment contract.17 "Under such laws ... a laborer who signed a
contract and then abandoned his job could be arrested for a criminal offense. Ultimately his choice was simple: he could either work
out his contract or go to the chain gang.', 8 The economic motivations behind contract-enforcement- and enticement laws were simi14 Cohen, supra note 5, at 35.
25 Id.

16Act of Feb. 16, 1866, No. 100, 1865-66 Ala. Acts 111; Act of Mar. 8,1867, No. 122,
§ 7, 1867 Ark. Acts 298, 300; Act of Jan. 12, 1866, ch. 1470, § 4, 1865-66 Fla. Acts 33; Act of
Dec. 12, 1865, No. 16, § 1, 1865 La. Acts (Extra Sess.) 24; Act of Nov. 25, 1865, ch. 4, § 9,
1865 Miss. Laws 82, 85; Act of Feb. 25, 1867, ch. 124, 1866-67 N.C. Sess. Laws 197; Act of
Dec. 21, 1865, § 54, 1865 S.C. Acts 31, 36; Act of Mar. 23, 1875, ch. 93, 1875 Tenn. Pub. Acts
168; Act of Nov. 1, 1866, ch. 82, 1866 Tex.Gen. Laws 80; Act of Feb. 20, 1866, ch. 15, § 2,

1865-66 Va. Acts 83.
17 A typical contract-enforcement statute read as follows:

Any person, who, with intent to injure or defraud his employer, enters into a contract
in writing for the performance of any act or service, and thereby obtains money or
other personal property from such employer, and with like intent, and without just
cause, and without refunding such money, or paying for such property, refuses to perform such act or service, must, on conviction, be punished as if he had stolen it.
ALA. CODE § 3812 (1886) (subsequent history discussed infra notes 19-26 and accompanying

text).
1s PEm
(1972).

DANIEL, THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY. PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901-1969,

at 25
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lar: both sought to limit competition for farm labor during the contract season. Competition could only legally take place at the
beginning of the contract year.
The contract-enforcement statutes were constitutionally vulnerable because they had the effect of requiring specific performance of a labor contract, i.e., forced labor. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled in 1891 that a conviction under the
Alabama statute required proof that the worker intended to commit fraud when he signed the contract."9 Some states responded to
this objection by amending their laws to include a requirement of
fraud. The Alabama Legislature went further with a law deeming
breach of contract "prima facie evidence of the intent to injure or
defraud the employer,"2 0 and several states passed similar laws.2 '
The United States Supreme Court found the Alabama statute
unconstitutional in the 1911 case of Bailey v. Alabama.2 2 The
Court noted that there was "not a particle of evidence of any circumstance indicating that [the defendant] made the contract or received the money with any intent to injure or defraud his employer" and that the defendant was "stripped by the statute of the
presumption of innocence, and exposed to conviction for fraud
upon evidence only of breach of contract and failure to pay."2 8
This led the Court to conclude that
although the statute in terms is to punish fraud, still its natural and inevitable effect is to expose to conviction for crime
those who simply fail or refuse to perform contracts for personal service in liquidation of a debt, and judging its purpose
by its effect that it seeks in this way to provide the means of
compulsion through which performance of such service may
be secured.
The Alabama statute violated the thirteenth amendment and the
19Ex parte Riley,

94 Ala. 82, 83, 10 So. 528, 529 (1891).
Act of Oct. 1, 1903, No. 406, 1903 Ala. Acts 345 (declared unconstitutional in Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911)). In addition, an Alabama rule of evidence provided that the
accused was not allowed to rebut the statutory presumption with testimony regarding his
"uncommunicated motives, purpose, or intention." Bailey v. State, 161 Ala. 75, 77, 49 So.
886, 887 (1909), rev'd sub nom. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
11 See Act of May 6, 1907, No. 271, 1907 Ark. Acts 620; 1907 Fla. Laws 182, ch. 5678;
Act of Aug. 15, 1903, No. 345, 1903 Ga. Laws 90; Act of Mar. 4, 1905, ch. 411, 1905 N.C.
Sess. Laws 422; Act of Feb. 24, 1908, No. 494, 1908 S.C. Acts 1080.
n 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
23Id. at 236.
Id. at 238.
10
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Peonage Act of 1867,25 which prohibited involuntary servitude except to punish crime: "The State.

.

. may not compel one man to

labor for another in payment of a debt, by punishing him as a
'
criminal if he does not perform the service or pay the debt."26
There is some evidence, however, that employment contracts
continued to be enforced without proof that the worker intended
to commit fraud. Often the worker would simply not know that the
law required proof of intent to defraud or that the existing law was
unconstitutional.2 7 Also, workers were sometimes "reclaimed" by
their employers, not by law enforcement officers, and forced without a warrant to work off a debt.28 Thus, the law provided a veneer
of legality for brutal activities that were actually illegal.
B. Vagrancy Laws
The second type of law used to enforce the labor-market cartel
was the vagrancy law. Vagrancy statutes essentially made it a
crime to be unemployed or out of the labor force. A vagrant was
usually defined as "any person wandering or strolling about in idleness, who is able to work, and has no property to support him; or
any person leading an idle, immoral, profligate life, having no
property to support him."29 Although vagrancy was usually considered a misdemeanor, this does not mean that the punishment was
trivial: misdemeanants were often sentenced to state or county
chain gangs.30
Obviously, a statute that made unemployment a crime at least
partially limited the amount of searching for new, more remunerative employment. More important, such statutes also increased the
cost of being out of the labor force altogether. We find examples of
the law being enforced for both these purposes. Blacks who traveled, even to visit relatives, faced the possibility of arrest.31 Those
who were not working, that is, who were out of the labor force,
were often rounded up as vagrants and put to work on local public25 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1994

(1982)).
26

219 U.S. at 244.

17 Cohen, supra note 5, at 38.
',

'

See P. DAsEmL, supra note 18, at 3-18.

Act of Sept. 22, 1903, No. 229, 1903 Ala. Acts 244; see also Act of Feb. 29, 1904, ch.

144, 1904 Miss. Laws 199 (substantially similar language); Act of Mar. 4, 1905, ch. 391, 1905
N.C. Sess. Laws 412 (same).
SO Cohen, supra note 5, at 50-51, 58; see also sources cited supra note 13.

See P. DANIEL, supra note 18, at 53; Scott, Negro MigrationDuring the War, in 16
PRIMnARY ECONOMIC STUDiEs OF THE WAR 75-76 (D. Kinley ed. 1920).
Si
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works projects or on local farms. "So common were such practices
to the police: 'Cotton is
that the Atlanta Constitution could quip
3, 2
busy.'
get
'vags'
the
that
See
ripening.
C.

Emigrant-Agent Laws

The final type of labor statute was the emigrant-agent law.
The Southern states enacted these laws to limit the activities of
agents who recruited labor from one state for work in another.
These laws regulated the white recruiters, not the black workers
themselves, and required agents to be licensed at fees of up to
$5000 for each county in which the recruiting took place. The laws
were often passed in reaction to a wave of out-migration,"3 and
many states increased the fees and penalties periodically in response to further migration. 4
By the time of the "great migration" of blacks to the North
during World War I, we find the city of Montgomery, Alabama
passing an ordinance forbidding persons from enticing laborers to
leave the city to take employment elsewhere, under penalty of a
$100 fine or up to six months at hard labor, or both.3 5 Although
these penalties may not seem severe, the ordinance was far-reaching. Anyone who printed, published, wrote, delivered, posted, or
distributed any advertisement, pamphlet, or newspaper persuading
people to leave the city was an emigrant agent for purposes of this
law.3 6 One response by blacks to this type of ordinance was to subscribe to Northern newspapers, which were outside the jurisdiction
of the local law. The Chicago Defender, a radical black newspaper,
had a fairly wide distribution in the South and encouraged people
to come to the Chicago stockyards.3 7
The primary economic effect of the emigrant-agent laws was
to increase the cost to black laborers of obtaining information
about job opportunities outside their local market area. The fact
that the city of Montgomery attempted to keep its laborers shows
how narrowly the local labor area might be characterized. The laws
could be evaded, and were, but not without cost to the agents and
to the laborers themselves.
3
Atlanta Constitution, Sept. 2, 1904, at 6, col. 1; see Cohen, supra note 5, at 50; see
also id. at 51-52.
Cohen, supra note 5, at 39-41.

Id. at 39.
Scott, supra note 31, at 76 (discussing Montgomery Emigrant-Agent Ordinance,
Sept. 16, 1916).
34 Id.
37 Id. at 29-33.
'

35
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The Convict-Lease System

In addition to the laws discussed above, Southern states employed the convict-lease system, a statutory practice of leasing out
state or county convicts to private firms. Convict leasing was
widely used in the South, especially in the 1880's.3 8 Unlike other
forms of convict labor in which the government maintains control
over the day-to-day management of the prisoners, the lease system
relinquished that control to the lessee firm."9 The firm had no interest in keeping the convicts alive past the end of their sentence
or contract period, since the convicts had no "scrap" or "resale"
value. In this respect, the lease system was worse than slaverysince a slaveholder receives the full capitalized value of the slave's
output for his entire working life, he has an incentive to maintain
the slave's health. The death rates on these chain gangs illustrate
this difference: mortality rates were as high as forty-five percent. 0
The significance of the convict-lease system was that its victims were often black misdemeanants, such as vagrants and violators of the contract-enforcement statutes. 41 The cost of breaking
any law can be gauged by a combination of the probability of punishment and the severity of punishment. 42 We have no direct measure of the probability of being punished for vagrancy or contract
jumping, but a forty-five percent chance of death as punishment
certainly provided a powerful disincentive for illegal activity by the
black laborer.
II.

SOUTHERN AGRICULTURE IN THE POSTBELLUM ERA

We must examine the agricultural sector of the South more
closely in order to appreciate the circumstances that gave rise to
this set of labor laws. The South had been physically and
financially devastated by the Civil War. Much of the physical capital had been destroyed, and family fortunes had been wiped out.
Agriculture, the South's primary business, is capital-intensive and
risky. Resources must be committed at the beginning of the season,
and no financial returns accrue until the end of the season. Emancipation had increased the riskiness: the human capital of slaves
See supra Chart I.
Cohen, supra note 5, at 55.
Convicts in South Carolina had a 45% mortality rate in 1877-80; those in Tennessee
had a 27% mortality rate in 1884-85. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 56-57. Cohen notes: "Convicts generally fared worse than this in other southern states." Id. at 56.
"

41

See id. at 57.

41 See RIcHARD PosNRs, EcoNomc ANALYsis

Op LAW

165 (2d ed. 1977).
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had been transferred from their former owners to the slaves themselves. Former slave owners and others who managed farms could
no longer guarantee that labor would be available during the crucial planting and harvesting seasons. Something had to be done to
ensure a steady flow of labor.4 s
A. Agricultural Contracts
Some employers simply hired laborers on a daily or weekly basis. Such an employer faced the risk that another farmer would
offer higher wages and lure his workers away. This was a particularly crucial problem at harvest time when the work could not be
delayed. At harvest time, the value of the laborers was especially
high, and planters were particularly vulnerable to competition. In
effect, hiring workers on a short-term basis meant paying them the
day-by-day value of their marginal product. Wages would be low in
the mid-season and relatively high during the crucial planting and
harvesting periods.
Planters resisted using this system for a number of reasons."
They felt they were being cheated when they had to pay high
wages during the peak seasons. They also disliked the uncertainty
of not knowing whether they would have workers at any given
time. And finally, they undoubtedly were offended by the sight of
their former slaves leaving jobs whenever they chose, and for
higher wages to boot.
An alternative arrangement would be a year-long contract,
with the laborer being paid a steady wage over the life of the contract. This was the type of system that most of the planters
seemed to prefer in the immediate postbellum period. Nevertheless, this type of contract had the disadvantage that workers
needed to be paid advances on their wages in order to live. Thus,
the worker often began a contract by being indebted to the
employer.
Advances were provided in response to cash-flow and capitalshortage problems. Workers could seldom save enough from the
previous year to be able to start the season with enough cash to
live on until the crop came in, or at least until they had performed
a substantial service in exchange for their wages. But even in the
absence of cash-flow problems, the workers under a fixed-wage

" See Reid, Sharecroppingas an UnderstandableMarket Response: The Post-Bellum
South, 33 J. EcoN. HIsT. 106, 107 (1973).
44 See R. MI-Gs, supra note 3, at 39-44.
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contract received implicit advances. A fixed-wage contract pays
wages that are higher than the value of the worker's labor during
some periods and lower during others. This means that sometimes
the employer will be giving implicit advances on the employees'
wages and at other times the employees will be making implicit
payments to the employer. 4 5 In the agricultural context, the harvest is the high-productivity time when the worker earns less than
the value of his labor. But during the rest of the contract period,
the worker receives implicit advances from the employer.
This creates the most obvious disadvantage of the fixed-wage
contract system. The workers had an incentive to cheat on the contract by quitting right before the harvest. 46 This provided the justification for the contract-enforcement and enticement statutes. The
Assistant Attorney General of Mississippi argued that enticement
laws were necessities "in an agricultural state where long time contracts are made and monies necessarily advanced in anticipation of
the fulfillment of a contract.' 4 Thus, the situation was inherently
risky. If the planter offered a fixed-wage contract, he faced the risk
that the employees would breach at the harvest. On the other
hand, if the planter hired and paid employees on a short-term basis, he still could not guarantee that he would have enough harvest
labor. In addition, he could not predict the wage that the competitive market would demand.
With all these problems, it would be surprising if some alternative form of contract did not emerge. By 1867, "a majority of
planters and laborers were ready to explore alternative crop-making arrangements"; in fact, sharecropping contracts and rental contracts developed after the Civil War and soon became widespread.48 A typical sharecropping contract required the worker, or
"cropper," to work the whole season in return for a share (usually
a quarter to a half) of the crop when it was sold. Money would be
advanced to the cropper and would later be deducted from his
share. Usually the landlord provided fertilizer, mules, equipment,
and management skills. Some contracts specified noncultivation
45 Readers who are familiar with the theory of firm-specific capital investments in onthe-job training will see why this is true. The firm implicitly pays for the firm-specific capital by paying a wage that is higher for a time than the value of marginal product.
4'
To be sure, planters could, and often did, renege on contracts that called for them to
provide services such as medical care. These contracts were enforced by the Freedman's
Bureau in the immediate postbelum period, but breaches by the planters rarely found their
way into court after Reconstruction. See P. DANmL,supra note 18, at 20 n.3.
47 Cohen, supra note 5, at 37.
4" Reid, supra note 43, at
110-11.
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tasks, such as barn repair and the like, and stipulated that the
cropper would receive a smaller share of the crop if he failed to
perform these tasks."9 Sharecropping contracts still involved advances to the workers, but they had the advantage of reducing default risk to the employer by giving the worker an incentive to stay
and work out the contract. The employer usually sold the crop and
could simply deduct what he was owed when he paid the cropper.
Since the worker had a stake in the crop on that particular farm,
he was not likely to abandon his job, even for the promise of a high
wage. Nor was he as likely to shirk in his effort as he would be
under a fixed-wage contract because he shared with the employer
the risk of a crop failure. 0
Rental contracts usually required the tenant to pay a fixed
rent for the land he cultivated. 51 This was sometimes a fixed dollar
amount, sometimes a fixed quantity of the crop. The rental system
placed all the risk of crop failure on the tenant and, as with sharecropping, minimized his incentive to shirk or run away.
By 1880, twenty-eight percent of Southern farms were
sharecropped and seventeen percent were rented.52 This suggests
that the contract-enforcement and enticement statutes were not
really needed for agricultural stability. Alternative crop arrangements existed that could reduce the problems that the laws were
meant to address, and these alternatives were used by a significant
number of employers. The sharecropping and rental contracts actually made the tenants much more vulnerable to breach of contract than they had been. In fact, most authors have concentrated
on the weak position of the indebted tenants relative to the
landlord.5
" See id. at 114-18. Reid quotes one contract in full. The relevant passages from that
contract are:
If any cropper shall from any cause fail to repair his fence as far as 1000 rails will go, or
shall fail to clean out any part of his ditches, or shall fail to leave his ditch banks, any

part of them, well shrubbed and cleaned when his crop is laid by, or shall fail to clean
out stables, fill them up and haul straw in front of them whenever he is told, he shall
have only two-fifths (2/5) [instead of one-half (1)] of the cotton, corn, fodder, peas

and pumpkins made on the land he cultivates.
Id. at 129.

50 Risk-sharing is the point that economists have usually focused on. E.g., Reid, supra
note 43, at 120-23.
51 Id. at 110.
52 Id. at 111.
5"E.g., Ransom & Sutch, Debt Peonagein the Cotton South After the Civil War, 32 J.
EcoN. HMST. 641 (1972).
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B. Debt Peonage
The term "debt peonage" refers to any situation in which a
worker is forced to labor to pay off a debt. It is used to refer to the
plight of the sharecropper locked into a sharecropping arrangement by being perpetually in debt-both to his landlord and to
local merchants wielding their monopoly power as the sole source
of rural credit.
Contemporary observers and historians alike have condemned
the debt-peonage system as exploitative of the tenant farmer, as a
hindrance to Southern economic development, and as a moral outrage. Ransom and Sutch describe this widely held view:
Sharecropping allowed the exploitation of the small farmer by
the monopolistic financial structure dominated by the local
merchant. Unable to obtain alternative sources of credit for
supplies he needed, the small farmer was forced to pledge his
future crop as a lien against credit advanced for the growing
season. The crop lien bound the farmer to the merchant and
restricted his options to buy elsewhere or dispose of his crop
in the most advantageous manner. Through use of his monopoly power, the merchant was able to insist that the farmer
concentrate on the production of cotton at the sacrifice of
food for home consumption, thereby forcing the farmer to buy
his provisions from the merchant. The credit prices charged
for these supplies were exorbitant, reflecting not only the local
merchant's inefficiency, but his exploitative powers as the sole
source of rural credit."
The weakness of this emphasis on debt peonage as the source
of rural exploitation is that the shadow of debt hanging over the
worker's head gave him every incentive to "declare bankruptcy" by
running away. This would be the obvious escape hatch from the
vicious cycle of debt, unless the system included some means of
preventing runaways and of compelling specific performance of a
labor contract. Without such constraints, the possibility of such
"bankruptcy" would place a limit on the interest rates the
merchants could charge and on the extent to which the landlord
could exploit the tenant through unfair crop division.
Exploitation of tenant farmers through debt peonage depended upon enforcement of the labor laws discussed above. Hence
the focus on debt peonage as the source of exploitation in so much
" Id. at 642.
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of the literature is simply a red herring. Debt peonage by itself
should not be the subject of the inquiry; rather, we should examine
the legal system that allowed forced labor. A system that can force
people to work can do so whether or not they are indebted. Debt
might provide a pretext, but other pretexts could be provided as
well; indeed, a pretext may not be needed if the power to coerce
exists. Rounding up vagrants and forcing them to work on publicworks projects is the functional equivalent of the debt-peonage
55
system.
Since the term peonage can encompass any situation in which
a worker is forced to work in order to pay off a debt, some authors
include the criminal-surety system in their discussions of debt peonage.5 6 This system has been described as follows: "'The plan is
to accuse the negro of some petty offense, and then require him, in
order to escape conviction, to enter into... a contract, under the
terms of which his bondsman can hire him out until he pays a certain sum.' ,,57 In other words, the black would be indebted to the
surety who paid his bail and thus be obligated to "work off" his
debt. The criminal-surety peon differed from an agricultural peon
because he could not run away. Purchased convicts were often
worked in chains and locked up at night. The black was often led
to believe that he was a convict, even though he was legally free
because someone had paid his bail and court costs. 58 Local sheriffs
and judges were usually quite cooperative in enforcing the terms of
the contract the black signed with the employer. Laborers who
managed to escape were often caught and faced even higher penalties to work off than before." Further, as one United States district attorney noted in 1903, "'[w]hen the time of a good working
negro is nearing an end,.., he is rearrested upon some trumped
up charge and again carried before some bribed justice and resentenced to an additional time."',,
Certainly the most egregious instances of physical abuse, beatings, and even murder were criminal-surety cases. 1 This is not surprising considering that the power of the law stood behind the
purchase of convicts in a way that it did not for the rural
merchant. In addition, a merchant's solvency depended on the
"

See Cohen, supra note 5, at 32-33. For other examples, see id. at 50-51.
" See, e.g., P. DANiEL, supra note 18, at 24-25.
57

Id. at 45.

" Id.
" Cohen, supra note 5, at 54.
P. DAmm, supra note 18, at 47.
'I See id. at 110-31.
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cropper paying him something rather than running away. The
criminal-surety employer had less fear that his workers would run
away, and if they did he could replace them at the modest cost of
the bail of another misdemeanant. His incentive, much like that of
the lessee of convicts, was to extract as much work as possible from
a laborer in a fixed period of time.
Thus, we must conclude that agricultural peonage and criminal-surety peonage are different and should not be lumped together under the heading of "peonage." We can also conclude that
criminal-surety peonage was the far more abusive system.

III. THE ECONOMICS OF EXPLOITATION
The term "exploitation" has been used very loosely by many
authors to describe the labor market for black farm workers in this
period."2 The purpose of this section is to offer three possible economic meanings or interpretations of the term "exploitation." I
call these three alternatives (1) monopsony, (2) limited or closedsector mobility, and (3) forced labor, and I will discuss the combinations of labor laws that might give rise to each of the three.
A.

Monopsony

Monopsony occurs in a market with only one buyer of labor.
The pure monopsony case with literally a single buyer of labor is
familiar to economists. The single buyer takes the supply curve as
given, hires labor at the intersection of the values of the marginal
product and marginal factor costs, and pays a wage determined by
the supply curve of labor. (See Figure 1.) The wage is less than the
value of the marginal product. Monopsony is the only one of the
three scenarios I discuss for which this is true. Monopsony makes
workers worse off relative to the competitive market and yields
rents to the employers. It is in this sense that monopsony can be
regarded as exploitative.8 s
What legal restrictions would be necessary to generate a monopsony-like situation in a market that normally has many buyers? The simplest way to create monopsony is to restrict labor mo-

62 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5; Domar, Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis,
30 J. ECON. HIsT. 18 (1970).

63 Stephen DeCanio clearly limits his definition of exploitation to the monopsony model
when he tests for equality of wage and value of marginal product. Finding that wages are no

less than and sometimes greater than the value of the marginal product, he concludes that
workers were not exploited. But this does not mean that exploitation in a broader sense did
not occur. See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
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FIGURE 1: MONOPSONY

Wage,

($/worker)

Marginal Factor
Cost
Supply,
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Quantity of Laboi

Wm is the wage chosen by the monopsonist and Lm is the quantity of labor chosen by the
monopsonist. The marginal cost of hiring additional labor is greater than the wage because
the monopsonist must pay higher wages to induce additional workers to supply labor. This
higher wage must be paid to all workers, not only to the last worker hired. This is why the
marginal factor cost curve lies above the supply curve.

bility completely. If a worker is unable to change jobs, his employer has monopsony power. But, as an exception to this restriction of mobility, the worker retains the option of dropping out of
the labor force altogether. Free exit distinguishes monopsony from
forced labor. In monopsony, the employer is constrained to offer
wages that will induce the workers to stay in the labor force. 4

" This is what creates the upward-sloping supply curve of labor. See supra Figure 1. In
a forced-labor situation, the supply curve of labor is horizontal at the subsistence wage, see
infra Figure 3, because the employer need not offer wages that the workers will voluntarily
accept.
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The contract-enforcement and enticement laws were designed
to limit mobility during the contract year but had little effect on
competition for contracts at the beginning of the season. It is possible to imagine the vagrancy statutes being used to limit mobility
*atthe beginning of the contract period. This would require almost
total collusion among the planters, however, since many of them
might find it privately worthwhile to search for new laborers each
year. The case for monopsony rests on strict enforcement of the
contract-enforcement and enticement laws and a particular application of the vagrancy laws. I regard monopsony as the least plausible of the three exploitation scenarios I consider.
B. Limited or Closed-Sector Mobility
A less restrictive interpretation of these labor laws is that they
reduced sectoral or regional mobility but had little effect on mobility from farm to farm in a given area. Limiting mobility would
have prevented reductions in the supply of labor to Southern agriculture and thus maintained a relatively low wage to black farm
labor. (See Figure 2.) Without these restrictions, labor would have
migrated from the low-wage Southern agricultural sector to the
higher-wage urban sector in either the North or the South. This
migration would have increased agricultural wages and decreased
other wages until the wages in the two sectors were equal. The
wage paid the black workers would equal the value of the marginal
product because limited local competition would prevent monopsony; hence, there would be no exploitation in DeCanio's sense of
the word, nor would there be any economic "rents." But a lower
wage would increase profits for firms while reducing the utility of
workers. In this sense, limiting mobility can be regarded as exploitation since the workers would not be earning the wage they
would earn in a competitive market.
The limited-mobility scenario seems quite plausible in the Jim
Crow context. In addition to the contract-enforcement, enticement,
and vagrancy laws, the emigrant-agent laws may have limited
sectoral mobility. The emigrant agents functioned very much like
labor arbitrageurs, bringing costly information about opportunities
in higher-wage areas to workers in lower-wage areas. The emigrantagent laws made this type of arbitrage activity more costly and
hence reduced the amount of information available to black farm
laborers. This, in turn, must have increased the costs of moving to
a new location. There could be extensive mobility within a local
area, and hence the local market could be effectively competitive.
But mobility between counties or states might be quite limited.
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FIGURE 2: LIMITED MOBILITY
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These graphs represent the supply and demand of labor to two markets, the Southern
agricultural labor market and the remainder of the labor market (which includes urban employment in the South and all employment outside of the South). Wa and W o are the wages
paid in these two respective sectors. Since W0 is greater than Wa we should expect to see
worker migration from the agricultural sector to the other sector until Wa rose and W. fell
to approximate equality. Because the restrictions on worker mobility described in this paper
prevented this migration, Wa remains lower than W o.

There is some anecdotal evidence to support this view. Reported cases of black migration being prevented by violence usually involved blacks leaving the county or the state. Cohen cites
one example:
In September 1937 Warren County, Georgia, cotton growers
sought to prevent the farmers of adjoining Glascock County
from enticing away their black laborers. Desperate for hands,
the men from Glascock County had offered almost to double
the rate being paid for cotton pickers in Warren County. Unwilling to abide by the law of supply and demand, Warren
County planters mobilized to stop the depletion of their labor
force. Sheriff G. P. Hogan described the ensuing events:
"There was no trouble, although a number of [the Warren
County men] carried guns and fired them into the air. They
told the pickers there was plenty of cotton to pick in Warren
County and asked them to stay home and pick it. They de-
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5

Emmett J. Scott reports numerous instances of legal and extralegal violence designed to prevent blacks from moving to Northern cities, including harassment at train stations and the actual
delaying of trains."8 We have already seen the attempt of
Mont7
city.
the
leaving
from
labor
prevent
to
Alabama
gomery,
C.

Forced Labor

It has been claimed that the Southern legal system was a
forced-labor system for black workers.68 From an economic standpoint, "forced labor" means that the market wage is lower than the
reservation wages9 and that the worker cannot drop out of the labor force. At the wage Wf in Figure 3, only Ls is voluntarily supplied while Ld is the quantity of labor demanded. Satisfying this
demand requires forcing people to work. Note that Wf equals the
value of marginal product, but not the supply price of labor, and is
thus exploitative.
The textbook example of this type of wage control is military
conscription. The government has the authority both to set the
wage at an artificially low level and to compel young men to work
in the armed forces. The situation may be deemed exploitative because the government benefits at the expense of the workers who
are forced to work at artificially low wages.
What aspects of the Southern legal system could have given
forced-labor power to whites? Clearly, convict leasing involved
forced labor. The convicts could not refuse to work and the county
and the lessee firms could decide on an implicit or explicit wage for
the convicts. The criminal-surety system also could be considered
forced labor.
While no one would deny that convict leasing involved forced
labor, the interesting questions are how convict leasing affected the
market in free labor and whether any other combinations of laws
might have simulated a forced-labor situation. Due to productmarket competition, convict leasing tended to lower the price of
free labor. Firms that leased convicts at a low rate and paid low
Cohen, supra note 5, at 59.
Scott, supra note 31, at 72-85.
'7 See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
See Cohen, supra note 5, at 30-33.
69 The reservation wage is that point on the worker's indifference curve at which he
would choose leisure over work at the offered wage.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
'
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FIGURE 3: FORCED LABOR
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Wf is the wage paid to forced labor.
L, is the quantity of labor supplied at wage Wf.
Ld is the quantity of labor demanded at wage Wf.
Ld-Ls is the quantity of labor that must be extracted through the use of force.
The supply curve of labor represents the maximum quantity of labor voluntarily offered
at any given wage. Since employers can force workers to supply labor, regardless of the wage
offered, they can ignore the supply curve for all wages greater than Wf.

maintenance costs would have had a competitive advantage over
firms that did not use convicts. Thus, free-labor firms, ceteris
paribus, would have been undersold and driven from the market.
Before they were driven out, however, we would expect to see
the free-labor firms trying at least one of two strategies. The first
would be to try to obtain convict labor themselves. This would
have bid up the rental prices of the convicts until the prices of
using convict and free labor were equalized. It would also have had
the effect of transferring forced-labor rents from the firms to the
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county governments. This would be comparable to the purchase of
a slave, whose price capitalizes the market value of his product
over his lifetime.
The other strategy that free-labor firms could have used would
be to try to have convict leasing abolished in their particular industry. This was, in fact, the more common strategy. The congressional hearings on the subject are filled with complaints from businessmen about unfair competition from firms employing convict
labor.71 This suggests that they had some influence, perhaps a decisive influence, on the final policy of using convict labor only for
government projects and not for private industry. Most states had
abolished convict leasing by 1890.72
For the states where convict leasing persisted, however, we
must examine more closely its long-run effects on the labor market. In particular, we must ask (1) how maintenance expenditures
(the implicit wage paid to convicts) compared with the wages of
free labor and (2) how competition for convicts affected the labor
market. To answer the first question, we must again distinguish
between slavery and conscripted convict labor.
1. Implicit Wages of Convicts. Two separate but related considerations are the replacement cost of a worker and the length of
the planning horizon. In conscription situations, the replacement
cost is fairly low relative to the capitalized value of lifetime earnings. Certainly an additional vagrant or chicken thief could be
rounded up for less than it would cost to maintain leased convicts
adequately. The lower the replacement cost, the greater the incentive to use more laborers and to lower expenditures on maintenance. This is a factor that tends to keep convict wages lower than
free-labor rates.
The length of the planning horizon also differs between slave
and free labor on the one hand and convict labor on the other. The
free laborer cares about his entire normal lifespan and the slaveowner cares about the entire working life of the slave. The reservation wage is set at a level high enough to maintain a worker's
health during his expected lifespan. The lessee of convicts and the
county care only about the worker over the term of his prison sentence.7 8 As a consequence, neither has an economic incentive to
7

See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 906, 59th Cong., lt Sess. 47-172 (1905); BUREAU OF LABOR
BuLL. No. 372, CoNWCT LABOR IN 1923, at 107-68 (1925).

STATISTICS,

73

See supra Chart L

78 This would not be true if the county were able to sell the worker at the end of the

term.
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care whether the convict survives beyond the end of his term. This
again induces maintenance expenditures below those that a free
laborer would spend on himself or that a slave owner would spend
on his slave.
2. Competition for Convict Labor. To understand the effects
of competition for convict labor, we need to modify the diagram in
Figure 3 to account for the two components of labor costs: maintenance costs and rental costs. (See Figure 4.) With competition for
convicts, the total price paid for a convict should equal the wage
for comparable free labor. Thus, the rental rate charged by the
county should rise to Re and the quantity demanded fall to L,.
This assumes that the quantity of convicts supplied is responsive
FIGURE 4
COMPETITION FOR CONVICT LABOR

Wage
Supply

R+M
M

Demand
Le

Ld

Quantity of Labor

M is maintenance costs; or the implicit wage received by the worker.
La is the amount of labor voluntarily supplied at the wage.
R is the rental rate paid to the county for the convicts.
R+M is the total cost of a worker.
Ld is the amount of labor demanded at R+M.
Ld-Ls is the amount of labor that must be forced.
Rc is the competitive rental rate, i.e., the rate the county receives after vigorous competition
among employers for convict labor.
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to market forces and that the level of maintenance provided by
employers does not change in response to higher rental rates. I
have also assumed that changes in the quantity of convict labor
have a negligible impact on the supply of free labor.
Yet even with competition, convict labor was exploitative. The
implicit wage received by the convicts was both less than the value
of their marginal product and less than their reservation wage. The
price paid by the employer equaled the value of the marginal product, but the employee did not receive the entire wage because R
was remitted to the government. The county or state government
gained at the expense of the convicts.
3. ForcedLabor in the Free Labor Market. Could a combination of laws create something like forced labor in an ostensibly
free-labor market? Two conditions would be needed: (1) dropping
out of the labor force would have to be prohibited74 and (2) competition for labor would have to be curtailed so that wages would not
be bid up. The vagrancy law certainly attempted to prevent laborforce exit. In fact, that is probably a fairer statement of the law's
effect than that it prevented job-search unemployment. It may
have tried to reduce search, but it most surely tried to reduce exit.
The enticement and contract-enforcement laws attempted to reduce competition among employers for agricultural workers. The
purpose of this attempt, as we have seen, was to reduce the competitive pressure for increased wages.7 5 Had this combination of
laws been enforced, a forced-labor situation may well have existed.
IV.

THE EVIDENCE OF EXPLOITATION

The foregoing discussion has served two purposes. First, it has
offered various economic scenarios that might be classified as "exploitative"; second, it has shown the types of evidence that would
be consistent with those various scenarios. The following discussion presents evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that
some exploitation took place. I do not attempt to distinguish
among the various types of exploitation to prove once and for all
that one particular type did take place. My aim is to persuade the
reader (1) that there is evidence to support the contention that
farm operators were able to exploit black farm laborers and (2)
that it was not the spontaneous workings of the market that made
74 Otherwise workers could avoid low wages by not working. See supra note 69 and
accompanying text.
7 See R. -IGGS, supra note 3, at 39-44.
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this possible, but rather the capture of the legal apparatus by those
who wished to discriminate.
I will examine three types of evidence. The first is evidence of
productivity, drawn from Stephen DeCanio's excellent econometric
study. The second is evidence of the relative mobility of blacks and
whites in the Southern states. Finally, I shall look briefly at relative rates of urbanization for blacks and whites, both Southern and
Northern.
A.

Evidence of Productivity

Stephen DeCanio did a very thorough econometric study of
agricultural productivity for ten states in the South." He esti7 for agriculture using
mated Cobb-Douglas production functionsT
the decennial census data from 1870 to 1910. DeCanio compared
his estimate of labor's share of output with the share that tenants
customarily received under sharecropping arrangements (from onefourth to one-half of the crop). 8 Since his estimates of labor's
share lay well within that range, he concluded that the market was
79
competitive and that there is no evidence of exploitation.
My disagreement with DeCanio is not over his evidence, but
over his interpretation of that evidence. By showing that wages
equaled the value of marginal product (W-VMP), he has only
shown that monopsony did not exist. The theoretical discussion
above shows that the conditions required for monopsony are so
stringent that its existence is a priori implausible. The discussion
also shows, however, that alternative definitions of exploitation are
perfectly consistent with W=VMP and some form of limited competition. DeCanio's evidence does not rule out the possibility that
either a closed-sector or a forced-labor situation existed.
In fact, some of DeCanio's evidence actually supports these
hypotheses. One implication of both models is that the observed
marginal productivity of blacks should be less than that of whites.

76 S. DECAmio, supra note 2, at 140-85, 220-40.
" The Cobb-Douglas production function is a weighted geographic mean relating quantity of output (Q) to quantity of labor (L) and capital (K). The function takes the form

Q=aLaK,6
where a, a, and P are the parameters to be estimated. The coefficients a and fi on the inputs
represent both the marginal product of that factor and the share of that factor in total
output. The important feature of the function for DeCanio's work is that the value of a
represents both the marginal product of labor and the average product of labor.
" S. DEC~No, supra note 2, at 140-64.
71 Id. at 165-71.
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Since blacks are being artificially attached to the labor market in
both cases, their wages, and hence their marginal product, should
be lower than those for whites.
DeCanio estimates the relative marginal products of blacks
and whites in his production functions.8 0 Table 1 shows a summary
of his results with the date of passage of each state's vagrancy law
and a few of the other important laws superimposed. The table
displays the years and states for which the difference between
black and white productivity differed significantly from zero. A
positive coefficient indicates that blacks had a higher marginal productivity than whites while a negative coefficient signifies the
reverse.
The table shows that the negative coefficients occur in the
years after 1890, with the single exception of Arkansas in 18701880. As can be seen, the states that have lower black marginal
productivity had passed vagrancy statutes within the preceding
decade. Some of the states with vagrancy laws appear not to be
linked with lower black marginal productivity; however, nearly all
these states passed their vagrancy laws very late in the period
under study. The bulk of this part of DeCanio's evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that restrictive labor laws, particularly
the vagrancy laws, limited black mobility and depressed black
wages.
B. Migration Evidence
Limited mobility of black workers is an essential feature of all
three models presented above. Data on mobility within states is
not available, but we do have data for net migration in and out of
states. The hypothesis is that restrictive legislation reduced black
migration rates relative both to their previous levels and to the migration rates for whites.
Table 2 displays net migration rates for each race by state
from 1870-80 to 1900-10. The first thing to note is that the primary
character of migration for both races was outmigration from the
Southern states. The exceptions were Florida, the southwestern
states of Arkansas and Texas, and, to a lesser extent, Louisiana;
this shows that the general westward movement of the American
population during this period took place within the South as well.

s0 Id. at 148-57.
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TABLE 1
MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENTIALSa BY RACE
FOR TEN SOUTHERN STATESb AND FOUR CENSUS PERIODS
1870-1880

1880-1890

1890-1900

1900-1910
Vagrancy
(1905)
>0

North Carolina

South Carolina

Vagrancy
(1894)
<0

Georgia

Vagrancy
(1895)
<0

>0

ContractEnforcement
(1908)
<0

Vagrancy
(1905)

Florida
Vagrancy
(1875)

Tennessee
Contract-

Enforcement
(1885)
Alabama

Vagrancy
(1903)
<0

Mississippi

Vagrancy
(1904)
<0

Arkansas

Enticement
(1875)
<0

Vagrancy
(1905)
<0
Vagrancy
(1908)

Louisiana
Vagrancy
(1909)

Texas
Source: S. DECANIo, AGRICULTURE INTHE POSTBELLUM SOUTH: THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY, at Table 4.1 (1974).
a Each entry represents the sign of the coefficient on the relative contribution of black and

white labor to total product for that state in that year. A positive coefficient indicates that
blacks have greater marginal productivity (at standard levels of statistical significance).
b Virginia and Kentucky were not included in DeCanio's study.
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TABLE 2
RATES OF NET MIGRATION OF NATIVE WHITES PER 1000
NATIVE WHITE POPULATION AND OF BLACKS PER 1000
BLACK POPULATION; BY STATES, 1870-80 TO 1900-10.
Virginia
White
Black
North Carolina
White
Black

South Carolina
White
Black
Georgia
White
Black
Florida
White
Black
Kentucky
White
Black
Tennessee
White
Black
Alabama
White
Black
Mississippi
White
Black
Arkansas
White
Black
Louisiana
White
Black
Texas
White
Black

1870-80

1880-90

1890-1900

1900-10

-28
-83

-50
-101

-32
-115

-35
-89

-13
-24

-29
-85

-49
-82

-52
-54

-58
-36

-22
-107

-56
18

-31
-18

166
131
-83
-98

-107
-92

-75
-54

-101
-81

-26
-11
-135
-24
42
215
-36
14
347
84

80
35

59
32

25
-19

& D. THoMAs, Population Redistribution and Economic Growth,
SouRca: H. ELDR DGE
United St ates, 1870-1950, in 3 DEMOGRAPHiC ANALYsis AND INTERRELATIONS, at Ta-

bles A1.19I, A1.22 (1964).
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The second observation is that in the decade 1870-80, the net
migration rates were roughly equal for the two races in almost all
the states. By the next decade, however, black migration in Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi fell relative both to white migration and to previous black migration. The pattern extended to include Georgia, Kentucky, and Arkansas in the 1890's. These
migration trends cannot be linked as strongly to state-by-state
changes in legislation as the productivity differences can be. Nevertheless, it is clear that some force was operating to reduce black
migration in these six quintessentially Southern states.
This is a somewhat different picture than the one drawn by
Robert Higgs, who looked at net migration rates for the entire
Southern region. 1 Blacks appear to have migrated as much or
more than whites at that level of aggregation. But Higgs's results
are dominated by the Atlantic seaboard states. Table 2 shows that
his aggregation masks distinctive patterns in the subregions of the
South. The southwestern states experienced net immigration of
both races, while the Atlantic seaboard states (Virginia and the
Carolinas) experienced strong emigration, particularly of blacks.
The rest of the South saw substantially less migration of blacks
than of whites. Hence, Higgs's conclusion that blacks migrated as
much or more than whites holds only for the Atlantic seaboard
states and cannot be generalized to the South as a whole.
Outside the Atlantic seaboard, blacks in those states that experienced net outmigration migrated less than did whites. Further,
state-by-state black migration rates fell during the Jim Crow era
across the South. This fact, too, is concealed by the use of aggregate statistics for the entire Southern region.
C. Urbanization Evidence
Evidence of reduced emigration from the Southern states is
not by itself sufficient to show the limited mobility of black farm
laborers. We must investigate black migration to the Southern cities as well. The hypothesis of limited mobility would suggest that
Southern blacks urbanized at a slower rate than Southern whites
and that Southern blacks urbanized less quickly than blacks
elsewhere.
There are difficulties with evaluating the evidence on this
question. First, since 1870 a larger percentage of the black than the
white population in every region of the country has lived in cities.
81

R. HGs, supra note 3, at 27.
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(See Table 3.) Second, if a region shows a decline in the rate of
urbanization of blacks relative to whites, we cannot conclude that
blacks were staying on the farm. They may have been moving to
other regions. With these caveats in mind, we turn to the evidence.
TABLE 3
PERCENT URBAN OF THE NATIVE WHITE AND BLACK
POPULATION, 1870 TO 1920
1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

Native White
Northeast
South
North Central
West
Total U.S.

37.9
7.7
16.8
21.0
22.4

44.6
8.3
20.9
25.0
25.8

53.3
12.0
29.5
35.6
32.7

60.8
14.2
35.5
39.4
37.8

66.5
19.5
41.7
47.9
43.5

71.5
25.4
48.9
51.8
49.5

Black
Northeast
South
North Central
West
Total U.S.

43.7
8.8
37.1
45.7
13.4

50.5
9.0
42.6
51.5
14.3

59.8
13.5
55.8
54.1
19.7

66.1
15.5
64.4
67.4
22.6

71.1
19.7
72.6
78.4
27.3

78.7
23.5
83.4
76.4
34.0

ELDRXDGE & D. THoMAs, Population Redistribution and Economic Growth,
United States, 1870-1950, in 3 DEMOGRAPmC ANALYSIS AND INTERRELATIONS, at Ta-

SOURCE: H.

ble 1.55 (1964).

There is some evidence in Table 3 that the rate of black urbanization slowed in the South relative to the white rate. By 1910,
the percentage of Southern whites who were urban almost equaled
the comparable figure for blacks. White urbanization surpassed
black urbanization by the end of the decade. This is not true of
any other region.
The racial composition of Southern cities changed over the
Jim Crow era as well. (See Table 4.) The percentage of Southern
urban residents who were black remained constant from the 1870
Census to the 1890 Census. The 1900 and later censuses showed a
decline in the fraction of Southern urban residents who were black.
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TABLE 4
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION BY RACE AND NATIVITY OF THE
SOUTHERN URBAN POPULATION, 1870 TO 1920
Native Whites
Foreign-born Whites
Blacks

1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

50.0
15.1
35.0

53.5
11.0
35.5

56.8
7.8
35.3

60.4
5.6
33.8

65.3
4.8
29.8

69.9
4.5
25.4

& D. THomAs, Population Redistribution and Economic Growth,
United States, 1870-1950, in 3 DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS AND INTERRELATIONS, at Table 1.56 (1964).

SouRcE: H. ELDRIDGE

Thus, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that Southern blacks became urbanized at a slower pace than did Southern whites. Admittedly, blacks
could have been leaving Southern cities to go North. But overall
state outmigration rates suggest that this could have been true
only for the Atlantic seaboard states. My original hypothesis was
that restrictive labor legislation reduced the movement of blacks
from the Southern agricultural sector. The data on urbanization
alone certainly do not (and cannot) prove this hypothesis. Nevertheless, the data suggest that migration to Southern cities was not
a significant escape hatch for rural blacks.
A potential weakness in the argument is that Tables 2 and 3
both show that there was substantial mobility on the part of
blacks. My point, however, is not that blacks were completely immobilized during this period. My contention, rather, is that Jim
Crow labor laws reduced black mobility rates from their previous
levels and that blacks became less mobile than whites. Both of
these contentions are supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION

The American layman has the impression that the economic
oppression of blacks in the Jim Crow South was the result of a
universal antipathy of whites towards blacks. He believes that
whites were so powerful economically that their private preferences
could be translated through the market into segregation and discrimination against blacks. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 196482
can be said to reflect this view in its prohibition against discrimination by private persons.
Perhaps the time has come to reject this view. There is hardly
" Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 88 Stat. 251 (1964) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982)).
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any question that legal sanctions were necessary to enforce discrimination against blacks. After all, if social pressure, economic
power, and custom were sufficient, why did Southern whites bother
to enact labor laws in order to extract what was wanted from
blacks?
The only real question is the exact role of the law in exploiting
blacks. This paper has explored that question in the context of agricultural labor markets. The significance of the specific laws discussed is that they were available to provide a justification for legal
action against blacks when such action served the purpose of some
white person. The beneficiary might be a specific white employer,
as in criminal-surety cases, or the state itself, as in convict leasing.
Finally, white planters in general may have benefited from the low
wages that arose from the legal system's generally intimidating effects on the black populace. In any case, the evidence indicates
that the law, not the market, was the chief oppressor of blacks in
the Jim Crow period.
This conclusion has important implications for modern policy.
It suggests that it is government, not private individuals, that must
be restrained in order to allow disfavored minorities to make substantial economic progress. At first glance, this may seem to be a
strange recommendation, but it must be kept in mind that the
main focus of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was on prohibitions of
various discriminatory actions by government. The economic progress blacks have made may very well be a result of these prohibitions on government and not of the far more visible prohibitions
on discrimination by individuals.
The Jim Crow period also provides an interesting related lesson on the ability of market forces to combat discrimination. Racism was at least as prevalent in the Jim Crow period as it is now.
Communities were smaller and more cohesive, making enforcement
of social norms easier than today. Yet, social and economic pressure by themselves were not enough to enforce a regime that called
for the exploitation of black labor. This suggests that these same
market forces could serve minorities well today. And if the market
is less competitive than it once was, that problem should be confronted directly.

